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Equalisation as difference: Zhang Taiyan’s  
Buddhist-Daoist response to modern politics
Since the late 1980s, scholars have viewed China’s progress towards market capitalism with great optimism, but in the last ten years 
intellectuals, both in China and abroad, have begun to voice reservations.  Critics have pointed out China’s growing problems of 
income inequality, unemployment and environmental degradation.  In this context of critical reflection, Viren Murthy argues that the 
work of the late Qing intellectual Zhang Taiyan is especially meaningful.
Viren Murthy
During a period in Chinese history when most intellectuals were sup-
porting ideologies related to moderni-
sation, such as social evolution, Zhang 
constantly drew on Buddhism and Dao-
ism to express criticisms.  Given that 
throughout the 20th century, and even 
today, both the Chinese government 
and Chinese intellectuals have gener-
ally endorsed some version of moderni-
sation as a political and economic goal, 
Zhang’s writings have an uncanny con-
temporary relevance.
 
Scholars have generally interpreted 
Zhang’s thought in terms of indig-
enous contexts, but I contend that 
Zhang’s philosophy, and the late Qing 
ideology to which he responded, follow 
a larger global pattern.  Specifically, that 
Zhang’s thought has similarities with 
that of critics of German idealism, such 
as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and 
that we can explain such conceptual 
affinities with reference to the common 
context of global capitalism.  Georg 
Lukács links the principles of German 
idealism to the social forms of capital, 
and provocatively contends that mod-
ern philosophers often mistake histori-
cally specific aspects of the structure of 
capitalism for universal forms of con-
sciousness.1 German idealists posit a 
transhistorical movement of conscious-
ness that realises itself in modern insti-
tutions such as the state.  Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer attack this structure of 
consciousness from an abstract per-
spective.  To counter Hegel’s idea of the 
teleological movement of Spirit, they 
argue that consciousness and history 
is a wild interplay of drives or the will. 
They eventually aim to overcome this 
blind progression of history and put for-
ward some type of alternative.  There is 
a similar antinomy between optimistic 
and pessimistic visions of history in late 
Qing China.  Specifically, the majority of 
intellectuals during the early 20th cen-
tury endorsed some version of history 
as a progressive movement and Zhang 
Taiyan developed a critique of this view 
from Buddhist and Daoist perspectives. 
Following Lukács, one can conclude 
that both sides of this debate respond 
a-historically to transformations of capi-
talist modernity, since each group pre-
supposes some type of transhistorical 
ontological movement, which becomes 
their foundational standpoint.
From imperial power to 
global player
To understand the above philosophi-
cal debate in the context of early 20th 
century China, we must note how intel-
lectuals were shaped by, and responded 
to, their rapidly changing environment. 
Social and intellectual life in the late 
Qing was influenced by widely circulat-
ing discourses of modern philosophy 
and the concrete forces of the global 
capitalist system of nation-states.  After 
a series of defeats in wars during the 
late 19th century, the Qing Empire and 
late Qing intellectuals began to think of 
ways to transform China into a nation-
state that could compete in the global 
capitalist system.  The modern state and 
economy entail a host of categories from 
citizenship to equality and intellectuals 
began to re-orient their learning and 
writing towards these new concepts.  
Until the late 19th century, Chinese 
intellectuals were largely trained in tra-
ditional classics and they aimed prima-
rily at becoming bureaucrats or func-
tionaries in the imperial government. 
However, in the midst of national crisis, 
they began to use their knowledge crea-
tively to envision a passage from impe-
rial to modern institutions.  In this con-
text, not only would intellectuals search 
outside of the canonical Confucian 
tradition and mine Buddhists and Dao-
ist texts for resources, they would also 
invoke the philosophies of Kant and 
Hegel to create hybrid theories of mod-
ernisation.  Late Qing scholars from a 
number of different political perspec-
tives often drew on Western philosophy 
along with traditional ideas to create 
new concepts adequate to the task of 
modern nation building.
One such new concept, which reform-
ers, revolutionaries and anarchists 
generally endorsed, was the universal 
principle (gongli).  The universal prin-
ciple refers to a concept or movement, 
such as the ethical principle of citizen-
ship or a process of social evolution, 
which subsumes particular things or 
actions. Intellectuals applied this prin-
ciple to both the realms of science and 
ethics.  Thus, references to the “univer-
sal principle of science,” “the universal 
principle of morality” and the “univer-
sal principle of evolution” are found in 
late Qing texts. The principle of evolu-
tion is particularly important, since, 
despite political differences, reformers, 
revolutionaries and anarchists often 
presupposed some vision of history as 
progress.
Zhang Taiyan’s attitude to this principle 
changes depending on the period.  From 
1900-1903, he endorses the universal 
principle and some type of evolutionary 
vision of the world in the context of his 
anti-Qing Dynasty writings.  However, 
in 1903 Zhang was convicted of writing 
seditious essays defaming the emperor 
and he was sentenced to three years in 
prison.  In jail, Zhang avidly read the 
sutras of Yogacara Buddhism and later 
claimed that it was only through recit-
ing and meditating on these sutras that 
he was able to get through his difficult 
jail experience.  When he was released 
from jail in 1906, Zhang went to Tokyo 
to edit the famous revolutionary jour-
nal, The People’s Journal (Minbao), and 
in this journal, he developed a new phil-
osophical framework largely critical of 
dominant intellectual trends.  
During the years 1906-1910, often 
referred to as Zhang’s Minbao period, 
he addressed both the reformers and 
the anarchist’s ideologies, claiming 
that they were insufficiently self-reflec-
tive. Following Kant, Zhang attempts to 
return concepts and the world of experi-
ence to their conditions of possibility; 
however, he understands conditions of 
possibility in Buddhist terms, namely 
as the karmic fluctuations of the seeds 
in Alaya consciousness (the storehouse 
consciousness). By drawing on Yogacara 
Buddhism, Zhang develops a vision of 
history as an unconscious process of 
drives.  According to Yogacara Bud-
dhism, the storehouse consciousness, 
which is the highest level of conscious-
ness, contains a number of seeds which 
initiate a type of historical process.  Dan 
Lusthaus interprets the effects of karmic 
seeds as historicality and stresses the 
organic metaphor of seeds.  He explains 
that just like plants, karmic experiences 
develop from unseen roots, which stem 
from seeds.2 As we act in these experi-
ences, we unconsciously plant new kar-
mic seeds and so a cycle of the interplay 
between past, present and future con-
tinues.  In his 1906 essay, On Separating 
the Universal and Particular in Evolution, 
Zhang uses this framework to explain 
Hegel’s philosophy of history.  In short, 
he claims that what Hegel describes as 
a triumphant march of spirit is really a 
degenerative disaster created by karmic 
seeds.  He then combines Buddhism 
and Daoism to describe a world outside 
of this karmic progression of history. 
Pushing language to its limits
Zhang develops this philosophical 
alternative in a number of essays dur-
ing 1906-1910, but he expressed this 
philosophy most completely in what 
many take to be Zhang’s masterpiece 
“An Interpretation of a ‘Discussion on 
the Equalization of Things’,” published in 
1910.  In this text, Zhang uses Yogacara 
Buddhist concepts to understand the 
ancient Daoist philosopher, Zhuangzi. 
Zhang pushes language to its limits 
to express an ideal that escapes the 
conceptual categories associated with 
karmic history and points to a world 
of difference and a new affirmation 
of singularity.  In so doing, he brings 
Buddhist, Daoist and Western ideas of 
equality together in a unique manner. 
More specifically, Zhang constantly 
gropes for a way to express something 
beyond mundane concepts.  Thus he 
contends that Zhuangzi’s conception of 
“equality” involves making distinctions 
without concepts:
“Equalizing things” (qiwuzhe) refers 
to absolute equality (pingdeng).  If we look 
at its meaning carefully, it does not simply 
refer to seeing sentient beings as equal 
… One must speak form (xiang, laksana) 
without words, write of form without 
concepts (ming) and think form without 
mind. It is ultimate equality. This accords 
with the “equalization of things.”3
The above passage may seem opaque, 
but given that Zhang explicitly oppos-
es his philosophy of equalisation to 
Hegel’s teleological vision of history, it 
is possible to interpret him as search-
ing for a concept of difference free from 
conceptualisation, a gesture we may 
find in Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy.  In 
particular, in Deleuze’s interpretation 
of his compatriot Henri Bergson, he 
distinguishes difference from determi-
nation. According to Deleuze, Hegel’s 
dialectic represents a linear movement 
because his idea of difference is exterior 
to the thing itself and hence inevitably 
involves both determination and con-
tradiction.  We see this in a number of 
the antinomies that pervade his thought 
such as the opposition between being 
and nothing, or between particular-
ity and universality.  Deleuze clearly 
attempts to draw on Bergson to think 
his way outside such oppositions and 
claims that in Bergson’s view “not only 
will vital difference not be a determina-
tion, but it will rather be the opposite – 
given a choice (au choix) it would select 
indetermination itself.”4 Were it merely 
indetermination, Hegel could retort that 
in essence Bergson is simply unable to 
think difference and thus the phrase 
“given a choice” is crucial.  Ideally, we 
should not choose between determi-Zhang constantly drew on Buddhism and Daoism to express criticisms.
Zhang Taiyan.
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nate and indeterminate, but from our 
usual conceptual grid, we can only see 
“vital difference” as indeterminate.  To 
express this paradoxical determination, 
Zhang cannot stop at leaving words, 
concepts and mind.  He affirms some 
type of mark made in this non-concep-
tual space by form (xiang, lakshana).
Zhang attempts to think of an equality 
that avoids the contradiction between 
the universal and the particular, or the 
antinomies between sameness and 
difference, which he sees in German 
idealists.  In Zhang’s view, it is not 
mere thought that produces concep-
tual antinomies; rather, through our 
karmic actions, we generate a concep-
tual framework, which confronts us as 
a type of inescapable logic.  Zhang com-
pares the conceptual framework that 
people create through karmic action to 
Kant’s categories and when he attacks 
this framework, he reproduces a basic 
structure we see in the pessimistic cri-
tiques of German idealism.  Rather than 
grounding concepts such as the univer-
sal principle in a historically specific 
social formation, Zhang links contem-
porary ideological trends to the tran-
shistorical dynamic of karmic action.  
However, Zhang’s philosophical signif-
icance shines through when placed in 
the intellectual history of 20th century 
China.  Throughout the 20th century, 
and even today, most Chinese intellec-
tuals presuppose some version of evo-
lutionary history.  The Chinese commu-
nists institutionalised such a reading 
of history and then during the 1980s 
and 1990s, intellectuals would often 
criticise Chinese communism using a 
similar model of history.  For example, 
they claimed that Chinese communism 
represented China’s failure to modern-
ise. From the mid-1990s, however, a 
growing number of intellectuals such as 
Wang Hui and Sun Ge, have drawn on 
the legacy of Zhang Taiyan, and those 
who develop the critical dimension of 
Zhang’s thought, such as his student 
Lu Xun, to question the legitimacy of 
contemporary capitalist society.  These 
intellectuals, however, face a problem 
that Zhang could never adequately con-
ceptualise, namely how to translate the-
ory into a historical practice that trans-
forms the global capitalist world. <
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